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Are Cultures Readable? Reconsidering Some 
Questions of Method 
Dietrich Harth 
In der Phdnomenologie handelt es sich immer um die Moglichkeit, d.h. den Sinn, 
nicht um Wahrheit und Falschheit. 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 
To read the world as if it were a book written by a numinous 
Author is a venerable convention reaching far back to the days of 
cosmo-theological myths of creation. To read culture as if it were a 
text composed and written by society and its particular collective 
agents and to look analytically at the world of man-made symbolic 
orders is a rather new attitude.1 There seems to be a need for 
permanently debating the key concepts involved in the business of 
analysing and reading cultures as texts, while the obvious attraction 
of this metaphor appears to be connected to those inter- and 
transcultural exchanges which in the long run seem to produce a 
very mobile and at the same time global texture of different cultural 
styles and patterns. The following pages, a modest contribution to 
the ongoing debate, do not pretend to offer some new rules or 
procedures of culture analysis. They just try to reflect from different 
angles some of the essential features of the above mentioned key 
concepts. Reflections, however, do not supply solutions and are not 
authorized to omit neither contradictions nor doubts. 
1 As to the world-as-book tradition cf. Blumenberg 1996. There are of course 
numerous publications pondering the methodological questions brought up by 
the culture-as-text model. I only mention the writings of Clifford Geertz, 
Crapanzano's critical commentaries and a collection of essays in German, 
edited by Neumann and Weigel (2000), which is an attempt to promote the 
interdisciplinary dialogue between literary research and interpretive 
anthropology. 
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So, reconsidering some questions of method is not like 
designing a systematic blueprint for the use of comprehensive 
theory-building. My aim is to show that notions like text and context 
belong to a set of interpretive categories, and that to favour 
readability as a criterion of cultural hermeneutics is more promising 
than to cling to the linguistic or structuralist notion of a formal 
textuality. And my argument is that cultural processes and their 
ascribed meaningfulness (Sinn und Bedeutung) should not be 
subsumed under the objectivity defined by nomological-
functionalist theories, nor are they an unconditional prey of those 
who believe in the absurd. The sense and meaning of cultural 
processes, writing and reading included, do not cease to be objects 
for negotiations, what we very well know and agree with when 
experiencing actions and artefacts as appearances gleaming with a 
puzzling significance. 
Legibility, Readability, Divination 
My paper is an instance of the question raised in its title. This 
coincidence is neither accidental nor does it on first sight seem to be 
of great importance. The trivial fact is: I read a text, which had to be 
written down in order to give it under particular circumstances a 
voice with the expectation of being not only perceived but also 
understood. There is, by the way, a peculiar semantic link in 
English between 'understanding' and 'reading' which allows us to 
ask a person who is expected to have difficulties in understanding a 
verbal utterance or a non-verbal gesture 'Do you read me?' So 
when I read a text to an audience the activity on the audience's 
behalf is not only listening but it encompasses reading as well, the 
reading of a reading in the sense of interpreting an individual 
speech. In other words, language use gives us our first clue that 
cultures may be readable, because this assumption insinuates that 
the structure of cultural practice is analogous to the structure of 
language use. 
But reading is more than mimicing a legible structure or 
misinterpreting an intentional utterance. It is, as Jean-Paul Sartre 
reminds us, not the poor reproduction of a 'given' meaning but an 
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act of guided creation2: the reader producing, during the process of 
tracking the composed texture of writing, his or her interpretation in 
the feeble shape of what could be called a 'virtual' text, while he or 
she is reflecting this experience in order to work it out in the 
manner of a well-articulated interpretation. 
It is of some importance to mark at this point the difference 
between the concepts of legibility and readability. To make my 
paper legible meant to acquire and to practice at least a bit of the 
linguistic competence that an English native speaker has bred in the 
bone. Legibility, therefore, stands for the technical mastery of 
using, in speaking and writing, a specific language system provided 
a proper training in grammar, rhetoric, (logical) discourse and 
(literary) style. In a rather wide sense the concept includes those 
features of sign-practice that are the very objects of semiotics. 
Trivially all cultural phenomena are sign-produced and have to be 
considered, so to say, as legible structures by birth. That means all 
'legible structures' have to be seen as textualized or - sit venia 
verbo - textualizable phenomena, whence we conclude that 
legibility is nothing else but a necessary formal component to the 
concept of text. 
Yet, the notion of 'text' does not mean here the formal 
linkage of language signs or transphrastic elements. As a 
hermeneutic category the term rather defines the coherency of 
situationally embedded speech acts. The thus indicated 
communicative situation consists of two correlative patterns: the 
pattern of communication, and the pattern of action, determined by 
place and time, and in addition, by the intentions of the participants. 
The phenomenological description of an event like this cannot 
comprehend these components all at once. It has to differentiate 
analytically, in order to be able to ascribe to the event as a whole -
for example a family celebration, a ritual initiation or the mise en 
scene of political power - sense and meaning. 
If a culture is seen as a 'complex whole' (W. Griswold) the 
same holds true for a written text which through analytical reading 
will unfold step by step its specific parts: rhythmic, semiotic, 
2 Sartre 1948, 15. 
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compositional and semantic patterns or segments. There is a great 
deal of difficulty in using a similar method in analytically reading 
the 'complex whole ' of a culture apart f rom the fact that culture, 
seen for instance as a performance, defies the formality of distinct 
demarcation lines. But this does not affect its legibility as long as 
we are aware that textualizing any cultural event or process is 
nothing else but a mode of perceiving the universe of cultures as a 
mobile connectionist network of dissonant signs. This sort of 
symbolism has a very old tradition and must not be misunderstood 
as the property of an academically inclined mind. 
The notion of divination discloses the essential meaning of 
approaching the cultural universe with the attitude of someone 
reading a book. Legibility, as we have seen, is a necessary condition 
of this approach because it includes the key to the architecture and 
formal connectivity of that universe of rules and symbols which is 
behind each individual utterance. Readability, however, refers to 
that what theorists of interpretation call the ' sense ' (Sinn) of that 
'complex whole ' considered here as a cultural universe. Sense is not 
the same as the meaning of a particular sign, be it lexical or 
occasional; it is, so to say, the general or possible 'meaning' 
ascribed to an utterance, a particular speech act, a communicative 
event the form of which can be described as a genre-specific 
configuration of textual patterns. To ' read ' (interpret) the sense not 
only of a complex whole but also of an individual utterance, 
therefore, is a question not of a simple discovery procedure like 
decoding a secret writing but affords the above mentioned Sartrean 
creativity because of the incommensurability of all symbolically 
mediated actions. Sinn, phenomenologically explored, means - to 
quote Wittgenstein3 - potentiality, not necessity. Certainty here is 
futile. Guessings, conjectures, hypotheses are the only means by 
which we can actively approximate that sense of an utterance 
(verbal or non-verbal) to which we want to respond.4 
3 Wittgenstein 1967, 63. 
4 For a systematic discussion of the hermeneutical implications cf. Frank 1980, 
13-34, andKurz 1977. 
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Sometimes the interpretation of non-written signs, practised 
for instance in shamanistic rituals, is not in accord with our ordinary 
experience of reading and our will to freely constitute the sense of 
an action or text. In that case all is different, because the sign-
'reading' of the shaman is carried out with the aim to understand 
and thereby to subdue the involved persons and recalcitrant material 
objects to a magically effective power. The comparison shows that 
reading in the sense of inteipreting does not necessarily exert any 
power over its object, may it be a written text or a significant action. 
The modes and methods of reading/understanding therefore entail a 
reflexive distance between the reader {interpres) and the object 
(interpretandum), be it a book or an action, a distance that also tells 
something about the difference between understanding (Verstehen) 
and coming to an understanding (Verstandigung). To come to an 
understanding presupposes always at least an initial communication, 
which goes beyond one-sided information about the emotions, 
beliefs and desires of the other. The psychoanalyst or anthropologist 
who wants to understand the other person, therefore, first has to 
arrange a situation of dialogue by communicating with the 'client' 
or 'native' about the most prolific moments for both, the I and the 
'Other'. But it is in his most detached moments, in the calm and 
isolated situation of retrospectively contemplating his experiences, 
that the analyst tries to describe the confrontation, to deeply 
understand the sense and the meaning (Sinn und Bedeutung) of the 
collected data and stories, to argue with his colleagues common 
opinions and finally to compose his own written interpretations; a 
process which very well demonstrates the labyrinthine ways of 
approximating by method and divination the sense (Sinn) of a 
legible 'complex whole'. 
What I call 'method and divination' in this context cannot be 
defined in a formal way nor is it a unique or substantive procedure. 
It rather is an attitude of deliberate, but reliable explicitness 
encompassing criticisability insofar as it is essential to the 
justification of the interpretative findings. 
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Translation 
I will leave this statement at this point, for the sake of further 
elaboration, without any comment, and return again to the 
dialectical interplay between the title and the content of my own 
writing. Obviously there is a muddle of languages behind my own 
writing and style of expression, my mode of thinking being 
moulded by German, my writing and its syntactic organization for 
heteronomous reasons being obliged to follow the rules and norms 
of a foreign language which I do not use in every day life and very 
seldom in academic communications.5 If - to freely paraphrase a 
famous sentence by Ludwig Wittgenstein - the boundaries of my 
language are the boundaries of my culture, I, while composing and 
writing an English essay, awkwardly sit on the threshold between 
two languages and definitely between two different systems of 
meaning. Whether this then means to sit between two different 
symbolic orders or in the middle of cultural difference I do not yet 
know. Anyway, 'sitting on the threshold' may sound a bit too 
shamanistic, but perhaps just this place outside commonplace 
attitudes may help to find a way into that cognitive state of affairs 
Todorov once called the 'exotopie, qui produit la connaissance 
nouvelle\6 
There is a very common basic term used to describe the 
communicative negotiations (Sprachspiele) between two different 
languages and world views; I refer to the notion of translation. 
Translation means crossing borders. Yet, I do not want to confine 
this meaning to crossing the borders or boundaries between two or 
even more different languages. There is also translation, in the strict 
sense of the metaphor 'trans-latio', between different modes of 
thought, and between the social varieties of speech within one and 
the same linguistic community, and even between different states of 
power in the old-fashioned sense of 'translatio imperiV. And, of 
course, in the case of a scholar reading aloud his own, linguistically 
5 I, therefore, had to rely on the friendly help and critical comments of William 
Sax, to whom I want to say a most cordial thanks. 
6 Todorov 1982, 14. 
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masked thoughts in front of an attentive but more or less 
anonymous and culturally mixed audience, I presume, a lot of 
translating has to be enacted. Not to mention the fact, that - as we 
know from Malinoswki's shift from the 'context of words' to the 
'context of situation' and finally to the 'context of culture' -
translating is dependent upon more than one move of 
contextualization.7 
So my not at all hazardous point is that translation in a broad 
sense can be regarded as a constitutive part of all communicative 
events, be it reading, listening, talking or bringing out the meaning 
of an action, a performance, an event, etc., by interpretation -
especially when there is a need to give this interpretation the shape 
of a printed page or of a symbolic action.8 The concept of 'cultural 
translation', some decades ago introduced by British social 
anthropologists into academic discourse, may have paved the path 
for what in contemporary discourse is called 'textualisation of 
cultures'.9 When we look closely at the metaphorical meaning of the 
term itself, we can see that it refers to the dialectic process or 
mutual interaction which evolves in all speech acts: the Latin trans-
latio has the meaning to carry something from one side to the other. 
And that is what for instance I myself have to do when I try to 
express my German-moulded thoughts and feelings through the 
medium of a foreign language. But that is, of course, also the very 
task of the ethnographer's work in the field, who carries all his 
cultural preconceptions into a world of habits and beliefs that are 
not his own, only to find out, when returning home, that his private 
habits have been, so to speak, translated by the experience outside 
and that he should be - as Nigel Barley put it - 'simply uncritically 
grateful to be a Westerner, living in a culture that seems suddenly 
very precious and vulnerable.'10 When working out this paper I 
Malinowski 1935, 17ff. 
It is obvious that the comparison of different translations of one and the same 
original text can show a great diversity of perceptions and discriminate 
interpretations. Cf. for instance the multifarious translations and stage-
realizations of Shakespeare's dramatic writings in India, Sisir Kumar Das 2001. 
9 Asad 1986. 
10 Barley 1983, 190. 
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twice had a very similar dream: travelling in a place beyond my 
ordinary worldly experience - sure, there were some shapes of 
strange buildings and some more or less ghostly streets - 1 was very 
anxious to find a fixed point of orientation, some sort of an 
indicator that would tell me what kind of order the dream-world 
could offer to the intruder. And as far as I remembered when I woke 
up, one of the signs was a bunch of green apples which I considered 
to be a rather ambiguous indication: either a set of suggestions for 
getting closer to knowledge, or a reflection of myself in the attitude 
of a greenhorn - in any case, it certainly was the epiphany of a 
cultural and at the same time textual archetype if one recalls the 
story of the apple tree told in the Bible. And so the dream, 
understood as a context, unconsciously accompanying the pleasures 
of daytime thinking, gave proof to that 'Eigensinn' which is part of 
our second nature and cannot even be uprooted by the most 
sophisticated methods of self-criticism or self-denial in the course 
of strengthening one's own empathy for the otherness of the other. 
If we go a bit further we might conclude that translation is a 
way of mediating between identity and alterity. Translation is 
indeed a mode of transition and the only response to the need for 
intercultural communication.11 If I want to spell out what is called 
cultural identity I would perhaps use all my wit to proselytize for an 
abundant heritage of German traditions. Changing from German to 
English, however, forces on me the attitude of a traveller, who, 
while he is marching in-between two languages, at each turn is 
afraid of being taken by surprise. 
My suggestions about translation as a constitutive part of 
communicative interaction so far have been very general and it is 
time to remember that in English (I am told by my dictionary) there 
exists a common linguistic reference which under particular 
circumstances can be considered synonymous with 'translation', i.e. 
'interpretation', the trade-mark of Interpretive Anthropology. The 
interpreter in both senses, as a translator of spoken and written 
language as well as an interpreter and analyst of social life and 
cultural symbols, without doubt is in the position of a go-between, 
Cf. Meschonnic 1999, 73. 
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he himself being the incarnation of trans-latio. The condition of the 
translator as well as of the interpreter is the condition of the 
'marginal man', who stays on the verge of two different linguistic 
systems or cultural patterns. For this and other reasons, which I will 
discuss later, it seems reasonable to conceptualize interpreting and 
translating as two aspects of one and the same operation, the 
operation we are used to call culture analysis, the analyst being 
constantly in the state of the 'marginal man'. If this is true we 
already at this point can see a strong contiguity between the 
activities of interpreting, translating and reading, comprising what 
Clifford Geertz calls 'anthropological understanding'.12 
The questions of reading and translation, of interpretation and 
understanding traditionally belong to the core of the discipline of 
philology where theories of interpretation and literary hermeneutics 
have found their most complete elaboration. But long ago the 
philological questions overthrew the narrow framework of the more 
traditionally carved out problems of genre evolution and historical 
grammar. Marginality, however, has survived and may be 
considered the prerequisite of that distancing attitude called 
reflection which intrinsically marks the operation called 
interpretation in philology as well as in ethnography, history or the 
social sciences. 
Texts and translations are assumed rather as means and media 
of cultural production and transnational communication. The theory 
of translation, therefore, is not confined to linguistic operations but 
pays attention to political implications as well and has extended its 
scope to the general topics of cultural transfer including a keen 
awareness of the untranslatability of that which makes cultures 
reciprocally different.13 The staging of a written drama, the ritual 
dancing of an orally transmitted myth, the painting of a scene out of 
a holy scripture all translate, i.e. quote and interpret, particular 
aspects of the 'given' text, while obliterating by this very operation 
other specific aspects of the same phenomenon. And in each case 
the elements of the translated are changed, or better enhanced by 
12 Geertz 1977. 
13 Spivak 1992.; Dingwaney 1995. 
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hitherto undiscovered meanings, because to translate does not mean 
to carry an unchangeable content from one code to another code but 
has to be understood as the opening of a debate about different 
views of one and the same topic. 
This awkward proximity between translation and 
interpretation is observed with suspicion especially in the discourse 
of postcolonial criticism. To translate means here anyway more than 
a simple transfer from one language into another language. It seems 
as though Wittgenstein's identification of the boundaries of a 
language with the boundaries of a world belongs to the 
unquestioned assumptions of this approach. Because the suspicion 
aims at that type of appropriation through translation which, without 
hesitation, assimilates everything that cannot be understood to one's 
own linguistic and cultural habit and style. But, I think there is no 
sound reason to exaggerate this suspicion, as some do, seeing in 
translation a sort of cultural 'violence'.14 
There is, of course, no simple rule to avoid adulteration. 
Translations call for criticism, because they obviously and 
necessarily work with various kinds of rhetorical dislocation and 
condensation and consequently produce 'another' text which never 
should be mistaken as the mere reproduction of the 'original' in the 
guise of another language. My point is, if the alien cultural practice 
seen as a text (a texture of actions and utterances) becomes the 
'object' of cultural analysis, translation is a necessary strategy. And 
the conclusion I would finally like to draw from the above 
considerations culminates in the assertion that - to speak with 
Peirce and Eco - the phenomenon called 'text' (something mute and 
absent) has to be seen not as a petrified structure but as a 'dynamic 
object' the changing appearances of which unfold in a never ending 
series of translations, criticisms and interpretations.15 
Cf. Dingwaney/Maier 1995, and Bachmann-Medick 1996. 
15 Eco 1990, 335: 'L'Oggetto Testuale e sotto gli occhi del suo interprete, il testo 
stesso diventa l'Oggetto Dinamico [...]. Quando interpretiamo un testo parliamo 
di qualcosa che preesiste alia nostra interpretazione e i destinatari del nostro atto 
interpretativo dovrebbero concordare, in qualche misura, sul rapporto tra la 
nostra interpretazione e l'oggetto che l 'ha determinata.' 
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It is true: this openness of the act of interpretation is often 
suspected of arbitrariness. The answer, however, could be that the 
process of reading protects the interpretation against an 
uncontrolled any-ness, if the reader takes the text at the same time 
as an object constructed by reading and as a yardstick (parameter) 
of his reading experience seriously. An adjustment, which is at the 
basis also of Sartre's idea of reading as an act of 'guided creation'. 
To sum up: reading in the sense of a creative process cannot be 
separated from the acts of translation and interpretation which the 
reader accomplishes while recognizing and at the same time 
transforming the textual patterns and their unexpected content. 
Reading is never a pure or linear apprehension of something given, 
nor is it the simple repetition of an intentional meaning. It rather is 
an imaginative and constructive process of building a virtual text 
with a new meaning by amalgamating two worlds: the world of the 
book and the world of the reader.16 
Text and Context 
All this affects the textualization of cultures and the different levels 
of anthropological or cross-cultural understanding, not to mention 
the outcome we are used to accepting as statements of proofed 
knowledge. But it is worthwhile to keep in mind that this should not 
be considered a weakness of ethnological and cultural 
understanding. To see it like that usually goes together with a well-
known 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'17 which suggests that 
given the right tools for scientific observation - the semantics of 
social and cultural practices can be foreseen and decoded like the 
path of a mechanical tracker. 
What was said above about the text also applies to the 
context, which is no less a text in the sense of an understandable 
phenomenon constituted by reading; in other words: an object and a 
To quote from Alberto Manguel's A History of Reading (1996), reading is the 
'apotheosis' of writing. For a more prosaic discussion of the creative 
construction of meaning in the practice of reading cf. Wittrock 1981. 
17 Alfred Schiitz 1973, 4. 
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condition of interpretation. Perhaps it is useful to discriminate, in a 
very broad sense, between the two types of internal and external 
context. The concept of the internal context might then refer to the 
relations between the (structural or semantic) elements constituting 
a dialogue, a narrative, a speech, a poem, an essay, etc., while the 
concept of the external context might aim at a diffuse potential of 
other texts that could be of use in widening the scope of 
understanding the focal text within a floating space of intertextual 
conditions, traditional symbols, linguistic systems, morphological 
frames, genre conventions and/or subjective preconceptions. And, 
of course, one could again distinguish two more subcategories: the 
external contexts the analyst makes use of, and the process of 
contextualization as a socially situated practice within the cultural 
segments the anthropologist has chosen as his objects of research.18 
The prefix 'con-' marks the relational character of all 
contexts, and is a reminder not to forget the relationism which 
principally belongs to the text as such, e.g. its relations to a 
particular language, to an authorial agency and to the reader's and 
interpreter's imagination. In addition, the prefix 'con-' suggests that 
a qualitative difference has to be taken notice of here. The decision 
to regard as con-text what in a different situation would be seen as 
the focal text, often is a question of deliberation: what the 
interpreter calls 'context' usually will be selected out of a limitless 
variety of other 'texts' in order to explain the first specified 'text', 
or in other words, to give the focal text a meaning with the help of 
indications dug up on the site of the con-texts. Neither text nor 
context are 'given' phenomena, they are selected and validated by 
the interpreter. Their relation, which often appears to be self-evident 
is dependent not only upon the personal encyclopaedia of the reader 
but also upon the scope of his research interests and conceptual 
frames.19 And, we should not forget, the first context of research is 
research itself: 'the interpretation changes the text, the changed text 
1 Hobart 1986. 
1 'Encyclopaedia' comprising the reader's world knowledge and professional 
competence: Eco 1990, 145-50 and 1992, 68. 
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calls forth a new interpretation, and so on and so forth.' In terms 
of hermeneutics, therefore, the notion of context signifies nothing 
else but the interpreter's practice to 'create connections' and to 
develop a heightened sense for the inclusive and at the same time 
exclusive effects of his contextualizations. 
But it is also clear that ... context is not 'given'. What is not 
given cannot be called upon or applied; it must first be 
created. Furthermore, there is nothing inherent in context 
that makes it a corrective for misunderstanding. A text 
'reduced to writing' may give us the illusion of an inside and 
an outside, of a part and a whole, or of lower and higher 
levels of understanding. In reality, in acts that produce 
ethnographic knowledge, creations of context are of the 
same kind.21 
One cannot escape context; not even the postmodern interpreter, 
because one of the contexts guiding his playful conjectures presents 
itself as a (deconstructionist) theory of decontextualized reading.22 
When using the terms 'text' and 'context' not as interpretive 
categories but as instruments useful to depict the interwoven 
structure of a verbal utterance, the analyst may construct something 
like a textual space. This multi-dimensional space is seen as 
consisting of words, sentences, paragraphs, intervals, chapters, 
books, genres, literatures, etc. And each of these units appears 
enclosed by the next higher and more complex one so that the 
complete textual space seems to be constructed like a hierarchy of 
infinite text-levels, not to mention the connections of these with the 
diachronic dimension of text-building and context-determination. 
This is, of course, a rather artificial construction which nevertheless 
may serve to make visible the essential context-dependence of all 
language-use, oral or written. 
zu Gruenwald 1995,79. 
21 Fabian, in Dilley 1999, 97-8. 
22 
There is no way out, as Taussig (1993, 237-8) hopes, but the critical reflection 
of one's own preconceptions. 
14 Dietrich Harth 
Another meaning of 'context', however, emerges when the 
interwoven complex of speech and action is seen in connection with 
the extra-linguistic, i.e. with the so-called 'situational data'. Yet, 
when speaking of 'data' I certainly want to avoid the idea of 
objectively given bare facts. The 'data' the historian collects and 
uses in his retrospective constructions of a past situation are to a 
maximum degree written documents, the significance of his 
archaeological and pictorial findings more or less depending on 
these written contexts. And even the ethnographer who under 
particular circumstances acts as a 'participant observer' in the 
cultural practices of a foreign world collects his 'data' by singling 
them out of the spatio-temporal flow of events under the premise of 
a preconceived research opinion and corresponding theoretical bias. 
In short, as George Herbert Mead put it, 'data' are abstractions. To 
perceive an action as a so-and-so action affords on the observer's 
side a notion of what type of action could be discriminated from 
other types. So the constituents of what an action, an agent and 
agency are, have to be more refined than the action, the agent and 
the agency themselves. What's more, situational context-data 
belong to that sort of evidence which is attainable only through the 
selective and at the same time constructive approach of the observer 
to what he - seen from his subsequent endeavour of putting his 
interpretations into a readable form - has witnessed in the past 
present of the particular event under investigation. 
In short, contexts must never be seen as determinants of 
interpretation. Of course, internal contexts guide the interpretative 
moves of the reader and give his assumptions about the latent sense 
of the chosen text the necessary support. To 'create' that sense, and 
in the end to objectify it, can only succeed when the 
interpreter/reader precedingly has used exactly the same text as a 
source of information. This information forms the contextual 
knowledge he needs to articulate that (un)intended and hidden sense 
of the text he is eager to (re)construct. Therefore, to see one and the 
same semantic system either as text or as context is a question of 
the interpreter's practice and is not dependant upon a queer set of 
features forming a chimerical thing in itself. I conclude: the 
concepts of text as well as of context - be it internal or external -
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are interpretive categories and hence can only be elucidated in 
connection with those terms which belong to the theory of reading 
and understanding.23 
Text-building in Culture Analysis 
The reflected interplay between text and context does not belong to 
the common sense experience of everyday life. But it has to do with 
the attitude of the interpreter constituting a world of readable signs 
and sign-linkages. And it is true, the criterion of readability is not an 
academic invention, it belongs to a heritage of divination that 
reaches back as . far as the habit of tracking down the game's 
footprints. 
When we seriously ask if there is a method or if there are 
methods in reading cultures, we have to admit that this does make 
sense only when we accept that there are analogies, if not affinities, 
between the fabric of writing and the fabric of socio-cultural 
phenomena beyond writing, and this is a question of text-building 
under the premise of theoretical and methodological decisions. 
Before I discuss the criterion of readability, which is at the heart of 
our problem, I would like to quote and subsequently comment upon 
a passage from Clifford Geertz's essay Blurred Genres: The 
Refiguration of Social Thought: 
When we speak our utterances fly by as events like any other 
behaviour; unless what we say is inscribed in writing (or some 
other established recording process), it is as evanescent as 
what we do. If it is so inscribed, it of course passes, like 
Dorian Gray's youth, anyway; but at least its meaning - the 
said, not the saying - to a degree and for a while remains. 
This too is not different for action in general: its meaning can 
persist in a way its actuality cannot. The great virtue of the 
extension of the notion of text beyond things written on paper 
or carved into stone is that it trains attention on precisely this 
As to a relevant theory furthering the interpretive methods in the social 
sciences cf. Habermas I, 152-203. 
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phenomenon: on how the inscription of action is brought 
about, what its vehicles are and how they work, and on what 
the fixation of meaning from the flow of events - history from 
what happened, thought from thinking, culture from 
behaviour - implies for sociological interpretation. To see 
social institutions, social customs, social changes as in some 
sense 'readable' is to alter our whole sense of what such 
interpretation is and shift it toward modes of thought rather 
more familiar to the translator, the exegete, or the 
iconographer than to the test giver, the factor analyst, or the 
pollster.24 
The argument we find in this quotation can be considered one of the 
cornerstones of so-called Interpretive Anthropology: Interpreting 
social life 'is like trying to read (in the sense of construct a reading 
of) a manuscript', and culture can be seen as a process of 'text-
building'.25 The notion of text offering the interpreter the 
opportunity of reading social life as a complex, but decipherable -
to use Geertz's wellknown metaphor - 'web of significance'; to 
study cultures as a system of meaning is positioned against the 
earlier behaviourist, functionalist or formal structuralistic 
approaches. Interpretive or, as it is sometimes called, symbolic 
anthropology, therefore focuses 
- on the production of meanings, 
- on negotiations of meaning, 
- on competing discourses, 
- on hegemonic and counter-hegemonic developments, and 
- on ritualized ways of embodying the semantics of social 
commitments. 
This attention of the cultural analyst and interpreter on construing, 
negotiating and changing meaning in order to permanently 
reorganize the universe of discourse of specific groups or societies 
Geertz 1993, 31. 
Geertz 1973, 10, and 1993, 32. 
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gave a push to academic self-critique that I would like to subsume 
under the title of meta-ethnography. The 'meta' meaning, that all 
the features that are to be studied as constituents of the cultural 
world chosen as the particular object of research must, turning from 
the observed to the observer, be questioned on the side of the 
interpreter so that the meaning of his terms and concepts, the 
competitive attitude of his writing and the structural, narrative or 
stylistic organization of his discourse are equally important as the 
objectifying of the semantics of the target culture. The very notion 
of hermeneutics (theory of reading and understanding), often used 
to characterize the major methodical interest of Interpretive 
Anthropology, is quite in accord with this tendency to illuminate 
and eventually to control the presumptions, the academic pre­
conditions and pre­understandings, which shape the methods, and at 
the same time guide the choice of perspectives in research. These 
presumptions are, by the way, not seldom the first and unrecognized 
contexts of research. 
Nota bene: Hermeneutics must not be misunderstood as a set 
of tools fit to decipher a 'given' meaning. It rather indicates an 
epistemology of understanding ­ and at the same time of reading as 
well as of translation ­ , which does not focus on a given object of 
research and knowledge but reflects how knowledge and research 
find and define their objects. This stance implies what quite often in 
theoretical or methodological discourse is called a fallacy: the 
circularity of interpretative operations. When ­ to give two fitting 
examples ­ culture is studied in analogy to a literary text, this is 
done with the aim of representing the results again in the form of a 
corresponding text, the subject of which, however, has switched 
from the actor to the author (i.e. the literal meaning of ethno­
graphy); and to study cultural practices with the plan for a book in 
mind is nothing else but another confirmation of the perspectivism 
innate in all cognitive moves. Second example: When the 
ethnographer speaks of 'reading a culture', he presumes that his 
written conjectures about this very culture will eventually find 
resonance in a reading public. Here we touch the question, on what 
grounds the authority of the ethnographic author should be 
legitimized? Marcus and Cushman in their useful and informative 
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paper Ethnographies as Texts have discussed this topic. Their 
proposal is to validate the authority of the ethnographer by 
thoroughly scrutinizing the following constructive tasks: 
- establishing a narrative presence, 
- envisioning a textual organization, 
- pre-encoding the presentation of data, and 
- anticipating the expectations of an imagined reader. 
The fourth point, which is my own addition, in my eyes is of 
prominent importance because it makes use of the classic rhetorical 
device that the author has to reflect the potential expectations of the 
ideal reader, whom he wants to address.27 There is, trivially, a big 
difference depending on whether one wants to convince - and 
striving to convince someone is a virtue of those who have dug up 
some relevant knowledge - a Western expert, a lay, or an 
indigenous reader. The other constructive tasks of text-building are 
not at all independent from that, as could be easily proven by 
showing to which measure the authority of a scholarly written text 
depends upon a set of communicative standards safeguarded by the 
academic institution. 
But let us go back to the question as to what it may mean to 
'read' a culture. Certainly, the idea of reading a 'culture' in its 
entirety is nonsense, especially since the term gives expression to a 
precarious and contingent process of creative practices and 
changing lifestyle attitudes. So 'culture' here must be reduced to 
some specific observable traits and traces, which the 
reader/interpreter considers representative of the social life of a 
group or community. I maintain that all cultural activities and 
phenomena are readable even if there is - as in ritual28 - no 
certainty about an involved intentionality. 
Marcus and Cushman 1982, 39. 
27 About the 'ideal reader' as a constituent element of the narrative text cf. Eco 
1979. 
28 'Clearly rituals are not really objects, but an object-like existence is given to 
them by the fact that they are ontologically constituted beyond individual 
intentions.' Humphrey/Laidlaw 1994, 267. 
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Circularity in Interpretation 
The circularity of the interpretative operation {hermeneutischer 
Zirkel) calls to mind that all methodically guided interpretations 
construe the totality, or better, the dissonant unity of their objects on 
the basis of those preconceptions extracted from the results of a 
most thorough analysis devoted to the details of exactly the same 
objects.29 This makes evident that the phenomena we call 'objects' 
of research, even if they do share the characteristics of those things 
which are materially well definable, are to a maximum degree 
phenomena in the literal sense of the Greek 'phainesthaV, a verb 
which is at the root of the terms 'phenomenon', 'phenomenology' 
and 'fantasy'. In some cases there might be a keen interest of the 
interpreter in the imaginative and in the imprints of imagined 
lifeworlds (secular myths, Utopian communities, etc.) on the social 
or cultural reality he has chosen as his research field (imagination 
being the Latin-rooted synonym of the Greek word 'phantasia'), but 
there is always the need to make use of one's own imagination in 
order to produce a certain conjectural, i.e. interpretative hypothesis 
at all. Yet, the use of imagination during the course of creatively 
'reading' a specific cultural practice as text must not inhibit that 
self-analytical reflection which gives the interpreter the right to 
consider his own approaches in anthropological understanding a 
rational choice. Imagination plays, as Max Weber has pointed out, a 
decisive part in the process of understanding the semantics of any 
human action, since - as I would like to repeat - understanding 
(reading) the other is a process of 'guided creation'. And in a very 
pointed form one could prolong this observation beyond the act of 
understanding to all actions taking part in building and transforming 
symbolic orders in general, including the ethnographer's 'work of 
Cf. Eco's description of the circle in Eco 1992, 64: 'Thus, more than a 
parameter to use in order to validate the interpretation, the text is an object that 
the interpretation builds up in the course of the circular effort of validating itself 
on the basis of what it makes up as its result.' 
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imagination', if we are ready to concede the truth of Pierre 
Bourdieu's sentence that 'all social functions are social fictions'.30 
It certainly is not enough to accept the circularity of the 
interpretative operation. To avoid uncontrolled misinterpretations 
which only lead to misunderstandings and erroneous conjectures 
one has to be aware of the dangers that lurk behind the 
unscrupulous application of determining classificatory schemes to 
the social and cultural units one has chosen to 'read' and study 
without asking why and for what reason. The 'Inclusivism' - to 
quote an example31 - seen by some interpreters as a basic and 
peculiar feature of the Indian mentality in fact is a historical 
response to that inclusivism of the colonial powers that could be 
seen from the point of view of the colonized as a violent form of 
exclusivism (from power, sovereignty, etc.). 
The example shows that an overall acceptance, which could 
very well rely on Indian sources, can easily entangle the interpreter 
in an elusive circle. It furthermore shows that the definitions and 
classifications the researcher believes to be neutral analytical 
instruments form part of the same culture which he wants to explore 
with the help of these same instruments. So he is in danger of 
falling prey to a self-deception similar to that of the scholar of 
religion who mistakes the ideology of religious fanaticism as an 
expression of a genuine and deep-rooted belief. Another example 
we could discuss here at length is the rather odd, but politically 
popular idea of applying a holistic, but at the same time exclusive, 
notion of national culture to those transitional and culturally 
fragmented societies, which under postcolonial and/or 
postcommunistic conditions are in a state of transition and turmoil. 
The term circularity reminds us of the hermeneutic circle, and 
circularity, seen from a general and perhaps rather abstract point of 
view, may indeed characterize the specific logic of methodical 
interpretation, because this logic proclaims that it is imperative to 
get as far as possible inside the world one endeavours to understand. 
This includes all the burdens one has to endure by learning the 
JU Bourdieu 1985, 76. Cf. also Greenblatt 1988, 17. 
31 Cf. Vivekananda, 1989, 25If.; Gottlob 2000, 99. 
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foreign idioms of the text-worlds (even if they are written in our 
mother tongue) and, of course, of those unfamiliar languages which 
are the media of writing and interacting in alien cultures. If this 
learning process is not misapprehended as a means to only amend 
research strategies, it inevitably will change the categories and 
habitual patterns of thought the interpreter considers his property. 
That does not at all mean assimilation into otherness. It is sufficient 
to look at one's own property with the eyes of the other, a change of 
viewpoint or of perspective (Blickwinkel) the result of which could 
be the concession that the hitherto familiar-seeming terms of culture 
and its dominating concepts of interpretation are not central but 
peripheral and, therefore, open for negotiation. If this happens - I 
am speaking about the attitudes of the anthropologist - it will be 
possible to overcome the force of his or her academic upbringings 
and it will consequently be possible for him or for her to use the 
process of cultural translation in order to check and transform the 
outworn tracks of conceptualizing.32 To get away with the 
'asymmetric ignorance' between researcher and the researched, it 
could then be useful to follow Dipesh Chakrabarty's proposal and 
imagine a world-history 'that does not yet exist', e.g. a history of 
Europe as one of the minor, i.e. provincial cultures.33 
One of the classical doctrines of interpretation reads: not to 
subdue the interpretandum to preconceptualized notions and terms 
but to be falsified by the stubbornness of the alien text-world. So, 
circularity in interpretation eventually turns out to be a special case 
of the circulation of meaning and at the same time gives proof of 
the idea that meaning in text can never be nailed down but is always 
open for permanent negotiation. While the version of scholar A is 
criticized by scholar B, the dialogical principle that according to 
Michail Bakhtin should regulate all historical and anthropological 
understanding emerges as a principle that promotes discussions 
between representatives of different versions of understanding.34 
This, in the eyes of many scholars, guarantees the openness of 
Asad 1986. 
Chakrabarty 1992, 20; Gottlob 2000, 107f. 
Friedrich 1993. 
22 Dietrich Harth 
interpretation and is at the same time a strong case against the 
illusion of a 'fixed meaning' (Geertz). And what is more, it calls 
into question the claim that the interpreter should be able to 
reconstruct in a full sense what he imagines to be the 'social logic' 
of a 'given' text.35 
The rupture between the written document and the world of 
cultural and social experience to which it belongs cannot be denied. 
A written text can never be considered the sheer exponent of a 
social or cultural system because it has its own immanent logic. And 
to read a cultural practice as text seems to plunge into a rather deep 
pit of illogic if the reader expects a logic the immanence of which 
belongs to his perception and not to the perceived. A reading, which 
uses the concept of text as a means to look at the interconnected 
phenomena of actions and utterances as if they were in the 
unswerving state of a functionally organized and rigidly structured 
system, squanders the possibility of understanding it as a ferment 
for sociocultural change. But readability as well as textuality are 
teaching something else. They refer not only to a processual 
structure of perception but also include all features of a dynamic 
system of changing meanings. 
Circularity, for instance, is a component of textuality, because 
it is the enticement of the text as a world of potential meaning that 
draws the reader into that business of interpretation which, as the 
prefix 'inter' signals, happens as the circular communication 
between reader and text proceeds. The specific text or document 
does not 'fix' meaning, it is nothing else but a source of potential 
meaning, which the reader who acts in the role of an interpreter uses 
according to his or her own intentions. And if his or her intention it 
is to reconstruct the 'social logic' of that period to which the 
particular text refers, it is not a question of looking for some 
ominous structure 'behind' the text, because the concept of 'social 
logic' in re is a need for contextualizations that far exceed the limits 
of only one single text. The information one gathers by collecting 
and reading the other texts, which in the light of the text in focus are 
As claimed by Spiegel 19 
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to be considered con-texts, can help construct a hypothetical 
meaning. Contexts are discovered by the interpreter, they are not 
part of the field encountered. 
Textualizing Cultures, and a Note on the 
History of Interpretation 
Hypothetical meanings are not to be mistaken as the unshakeable 
expression of an objective state of affairs. They are constituted with 
the help of the interpreter's imagination and creative wit to collect 
and to combine a set of con-texts that fits into his or her project of 
anthropologically understanding the utterances and actions forming 
an essential part of the culture system. It is, of course, most 
important to be conscious of the difference between the 
interpretation of a text and the interpretation of a culture system. 
The text to be analysed may form part of the culture in question, yet 
this should warn the interpreter against taking it as a representation 
of the whole; despite the unfortunate habit of reading particular, 
especially the canonized texts metonymically as pars pro toto. 
To 'read' a culture is not the same as reading a drama, a novel 
or a history book. It is a highly imaginative task, to a certain degree 
comparable to the scholastic programme of contemplating the Book 
of Nature in order to get in contact with the wisdom of the 
Unspeakable. There is an important truth in the attitude of paying 
respect to the Unspeakable even if it bears the name of an author, 
whose individual features could easily be identified. The 'text' of 
culture and the Book of Nature are neither reducible to the ideas and 
intentions of one well-known author, nor do they consist of a 
universe of alphabetical signs the comprehension of which does not 
afford any kind of exegesis including divination. And yet, the 
metaphors of 'Book' and 'text' suggest that both components -
authorial intentions and some sort of sign-material - have to be 
taken for granted, because otherwise the rhetoric of 'reading' would 
make no sense. 
Before discussing some more aspects of reading, translation 
and textuality let me continue with a short recollection of the 
nineteenth century history of hermeneutics and language 
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philosophy, to which we owe - notwithstanding all changes of 
paradigmata or perspectives which have happened since then -
some of the most important insights into the fundamental principles 
of a methodically trained reading and understanding. The key 
concept of text emerges under the guise of figurative speech in 
Wilhelm von Humboldt's philosophy of language as well as in 
Wilhelm Dilthey's writings on the philosophy of science. Both use 
the term texture ('Gewebe'), which is in close relationship to 
Clifford Geertz' web, in order to circumscribe the complexity of 
cultural phenomena. Humboldt's metaphor symbolic texture 
('symbolisches Gewebe') describes not only the system of language 
but also world history {'Sprache und Weltgeschichte,).3b And both 
discern the logical impossibility of analysing this web from outside: 
interpreter and historian are both entangled in the same web they 
want to disentangle. The differences of natural languages do not 
alter this situation since to investigate the world system embodied in 
another language or in the histories that have become strange again 
in any case presupposes understanding. But understanding is 
translation, i.e. the above mentioned crossing of boundaries 
between different languages, different modes of thinking, different 
ways of life and different cultural habits. So the difference between 
us and them has not to be seen as a divide never to be bridged. The 
common ground of mutual understanding Humboldt is searching in 
what he calls the 'work of mind' ('Arbeit des Geistes'), this being a 
paraphrase of all linguistic facts and of language in general. 
Dilthey on the other hand is concentrating on an 
anthropological universal, i.e. the common psychological 
disposition of empathy which provides every human being the 
possibility of understanding each other. Neither Dilthey nor 
Humboldt has misinterpreted the methodically trained hermeneutic 
understanding as a means to level the differences between 
individuals, groups, societies and cultures. On the contrary, 
Humboldt's dialectic mode of thought induced him to mark 
'difference' as a version of not-understanding which turns up in all 
communicative interactions. In his treatise Ueber die 
Humboldt 1963, 396 and 403. About Dilthey cf. Harth 1998, 58ff. 
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Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einflufi 
auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts (1830-1835) 
we read: 'Alles Verstehen ist ... immer zugleich ein Nicht-
Verstehen, alle Uebereinstimmung in Gedanken und Gefiihlen 
zugleich ein Auseinandergehen.' (... all understanding is always at 
the same time a not-understanding, all concurrence in thought and 
feeling at the same time divergence.)1'1 With this argument 
Humboldt enforces what can be considered the first principle of the 
hermeneutic condition: the acceptance of an alterity, which can 
approximately be bridged but never be blotted out by interpretation. 
To ponder, theorize and philosophize about understanding 
{Verstehen) expresses the simple truth that understanding is neither 
given nor a matter of fact. On the contrary, the reason to strive for 
understanding is difference, i.e. the impossibility of complete 
accord. 
The frequent use of the metaphor 'Gewebe' (texture or web) 
from Humboldt to Geertz indicates, so to speak, a systemic 
composure of the heterogeneous facts of socio-cultural life. 
Ominous ideological trends in the theory of culture and society 
often enough have claimed this composure to be of biological, 
ethnic or racial origin. The notion or image of 'web' is, as the 
quotation from Geertz has shown, an equivalent of text, if we keep 
the Latin original in mind. It is time now to find out why the 
interpreter of cultures prefers the text analogy to other possible and 
current comparisons or models like drama or game. I will try to 
prepare an answer by scrutinizing a small selection of text-theories 
and have for that reason consulted Jurij Lotman's structuralist 
position, Harald Weinrich's linguistic proposals, Umberto Eco's 
theory of semiosis and Paul Ricoeur's important and influential 
philosophical reflections concerning the notion of text and the 
definition of textuality; the latter being a notion which comprises all 
traits that make a text a text. For the sake of brevity I will combine 
the major arguments without again mentioning the authors' names. 
Humboldt 1963, 439. Engl, transl. in Humboldt 1988, 63. 
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Text Models and Applications 
The so-called cultural turn in ethnology and social sciences is a 
parting from positivistic and scientific thinking. Under positivistic 
signs the power of the interpreter, including the field worker as well 
as the historian, over its objects - the critics of this paradigm assure 
us - was left unquestioned. Even the structuralists, who had 
nevertheless developed a consciousness of the decisive power of 
concepts and methods over the analyst's mind, retained within their 
taxonomic fetishism something of an inheritance from objectivist 
model-building. On the other hand, questioning the nature and 
scope of structures promoted contacts between the theory of culture 
and language theory, and gave the semantic perspective an 
important breakthrough. The contexts of theory-building have 
changed: hard theories of the nomological type no longer prevail; 
soft theories of language research and literary hermeneutics have 
conquered the field and have given weight to those questions 
concerned with the use and effect of symbols in social and cultural 
practice. 
The spreading of the metaphors of reading and 
(con)textualizing throughout cultural studies at first seems to lead in 
another direction. The decision of the anthropologist of culture, the 
sociologist or historian for the text model first of all limits the 
possibilities and the freedom of the interpreter. However, the 
interpreter is relatively free to adopt this course. One's choice to 
regard the world philosophically, historically, religiously or 
poetically, can be justified neither by induction nor by deduction. It 
is a choice between divergent paradigms, or - differently said - a 
selection from a multitude of possible viewpoints, which may 
elucidate different aspects of the world. So the question is, why 
look at a world of cultures as if these were spelled out like written 
texts? If there is nothing other than what the poststructuralists tell 
us, a world made up of a multitude and diversity of texts, then there 
is not much hope for a free choice between divergent paradigms. 
Yet, many reasons could be found to defend the universalism 
of the text model. First of all, there is the simple fact that writing 
and reading are the elementary prerequisites for a reflected and 
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knowledge-oriented view of world and man. Second, there is the 
widely accepted conviction - pace Plato - that no medium is better 
suited to manufacture quantitative and qualitative orders of being 
than writing. Third, the text metaphor connected with the idea of 
organization points out that texts do not partition themselves 
mutually, but are all potentially linked, which reflects the 
widespread use of the context term. 'Everything is interrelated': this 
saying of the Indian storyteller, who prolongs the life of the 
tradition by orally distributing the traditionally handed down written 
mythologies,38 matches the poststructuralist view that there is 
nothing beyond that semiotic connectivity which is at the heart of 
all textual operations and is therefore the basic principle of 
textuality itself. Fourth, and finally, a powerful and culturally 
widespread tradition suggests that all humans capable of reading 
and writing look at nature and the universe as a book written by a 
supreme being, not to speak of the evocative role of the book as a 
matrix of 'reading' the human condition.39 
Let us regard first the theoretical and methodical implications 
connected with the text model. To understand a religious 
celebration, a political ritual, or the play of the folk theatre as texts 
inevitably excludes the points of view of those persons who are 
involved as activists and/or participants. This is because the term 
'text', like every other theoretically-founded descriptive term, does 
not belong to the 'facts' (Tat-Sachen) but rather to the perspective 
of the researcher, who regards and describes these circumstances. 
We could, therefore, say that at a very general methodical level, 
'text' operates as a heuristic model. When applied, the model 
subordinates the specific cultural practice (celebration, ritual, play, 
etc.) to a formal structure which suspends the experienced 
performance of this practice by specific generalizations and 
abstractions. The structure of any written text conveying sense and 
meaning (Sinn und Bedeutung) has to be in accordance not only 
with orthography and grammatical rules (syntax and semantics) but 
Narayan 1994, 4. 
For example the special role of the self-book metaphor; cf. Jager 2000. 
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also with certain conventions of formality (genre, composition), 
communication and publishing practices (para-texts). 
Against this background, the term 'text-structure' appears as a 
summary of the collectively shared formal and semantic regularities 
and conventions belonging to the writing culture of a community. 
The 'social logic' of the texts, which the historical or 
ethnographical interpreter wishes to reconstruct, could therefore 
perhaps be considered a function of the structure of those texts 
produced within the boundaries of a particular group and its cultural 
habits, and not as an outward phenomenon. 
But the restriction reads: As each written text is to be 
understood as a part of a whole writing culture which might be 
described historically and regionally, equally each cultural action 
(e.g. celebration, play or ritual) which the interpreter with the help 
of the text model would like to 'read', i.e. to understand, is one part 
of the religious, political, aesthetic, etc., culture maintained by the 
community, the communal culture as a whole being itself a complex 
whole of different cultural activities; hence arises the problem of 
selection and evaluation. In literary criticism, selection and 
evaluation have already occurred: the interpreter usually adheres to 
a given canon or sets up an anti-canon, before he himself opens the 
literary account in order to read and analyse. To set up, however, a 
canon of the cultural practices of a community does not make much 
sense. Each group, each social player has his own way of life and 
his own life-style. What is common to all is nothing other than the 
imaginaire social, a vague and permanently contested image of 
shared values, ideals, identities and symbols. If we want to 
understand this world of signs and beliefs with the help of the text 
model we once more have to ask in which sense the notion of text 
has to be transformed (translated) in order to fulfil the task of a 
useful optical instrument. 
First, the trivial: the indispensable elements of all written texts 
are the characters and the rules governing the organization of the 
characters into words, sentences, paragraphs, chapters or similar 
formal patterns. The code - be it a lexical code, a code of grammar, 
of style or of genre - usually does not turn up in the text itself, and 
yet it seems a precondition for its legibility, namely, for 
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intentionally structuring and reading the text. By some theorists the 
code, which is nothing else but a synonym for our term 'legibility', 
is seen as a normative set of general rules not only guiding the 
organization of writing and composing but also as an instruction for 
properly reading the text; reading in this case used to designate an 
act of decoding (there are many ways of reading). In this respect the 
concept of code is neatly connected to the construction of meaning, 
be this the work of the author or that of the reader. But it lacks the 
creative aspects of that constitution of Sinn (sense) described above 
as an act of divination and interpretation. The meanings, however, 
of words, sentences, paragraphs, etc., within the text are not only 
dependent upon the specific codes coming from outside. All the 
existing elements of a particular text have their own specific 
meanings which are the result of a so-called context-determination. 
Therefore, on the level of text-semantics, we have to distinguish at 
least between two interconnected types of meaning: 
1. CODE-MEANING - dependent on consciously or unconsciously 
realized rules of speech and writing which with respect to the 
legibility of the item affords lexical and grammatical 
competences. 
2. TEXT-MEANING as a result of the determination of code-
meaning by the surrounding context. To understand this 
meaning is not only a question of decoding, since it also affords 
what is called the hermeneutic competence to experience 
communication, because all texts - written or oral - can be 
considered communicative acts the intention of which gives the 
spoken or written text its effective individual shape. 
Hermeneutic competence is nothing other than the rational 
capability to produce and to read the procedural and ever 
changing textures of linguistically mediated interactions. 
Before we decide to convey these interconnected types of meaning 
to the realm of sociocultural understanding we have to consider the 
particularities of the written text. The first duty of historical and, to 
a certain degree, of ethnohistorical research is to study the written 
30 Dietrich Harth 
records and not the process of an action the interpreter attended 
himself as an eyewitness. 
The concept of text in fact is a handicraft metaphor, it evokes 
the image of a weaver (textor) sitting at the loom producing a tissue 
or carpet by moving the shuttle to and fro. The metaphorical use of 
the concept is old and widespread. It keeps the allusion to creative 
doing, which does not alone satisfy a basic need because the 
patterns, which the weaver inserts into the fabric, do not support the 
material value or the user 's pragmatic expectations of his 
commodity. So there is a surplus we should not forget when 
transferring the concept onto other than handicraft products. The 
transfer, to make a first point, makes sure that the object alluded to 
as a text has to be considered as something made, created, 
produced, or to put it another way, a materially perceivable thing 
that refers to a maker (author), to a set of rules for production 
(poetics) and to a person or group who is in want of the product 
(consumer). A written or spoken text may approximately fit this 
model, since there is an author, a set of codes and a recipient or 
addressee (individual or collective). 
To repeat this in a more elaborate way: The indispensable 
features of a text are: (1) a stock of discriminate symbols (sign 
system), (2) a person uttering and composing the text (author), (3) a 
set of rules for text-building (code) and (4) a recipient sharing at 
least a part of the rules used for text-building (reader). The possible 
rules are not confined to a singular code-register. On the contrary, 
text-building normally makes use - even in one and the same genre 
- of a heterogeneous variety of different codes, since there are: 
- genre (strategies of composition), 
- rhetoric (strategies of persuasion), 
- logic (strategies of argument), 
- style (strategies of aesthetic amplification). 
To apply this structure to a cultural system does not at all seem 
appropriate, especially since it is pretty obvious that text-weaving 
and its particular products are small particles in the whole mosaic of 
culture. If one considers culture a process of symbolic action carried 
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out by a group or society or any other collective unit it seems to 
lack intentionality. So it is without a well defined subject acclaimed 
to have the authority and authorial meaning of a written utterance, 
and it lacks, so to speak, the patterns which can be identified in the 
written text by applying the above mentioned methods for reading a 
code-guided action. 
Of course, applying the text model as a methodical analogy to 
the 'reading' of a culture system does not afford complete 
congruency, and yet, the choice of the model should be backed by a 
rich consonance in order to provide reliable conditions for a 
promising outcome. To read cultures as semiotic systems of signs 
and symbols first was proposed by the School of Tartu (Lotman 
1990). Practically all cultural and social phenomena - ritual, 
language, art, gestures and so forth - are semiotic, i.e. in our sense 
readable phenomena. But there was a limit as to what could be 
regarded as a text, since the cultural semiotics of the Tartu school 
kept to substantial features that would decide if a cultural unit is 
worth interpreting, the criterion of semantic content being the only 
criterion that would help to distinguish between a cultural text and a 
non-text. Textuality in this view is not restricted to formality, but 
depends upon the interpreter's competence to judge and, finally, 
leaves him the choice whether to put aside what he takes to be 
nothing else but a routine, or to make it the target of his analysis. To 
make textuality a question of semiotic competence is a concession 
to the arbitrariness of textualism and text theory. And, indeed, there 
are many different and contradictory theories, models and 
paradigms, but none of them can be induced on the basis of a sound 
empirical proof; even in linguistics the variety of concepts matches 
nothing else but a wide range of different theoretical designs open 
for permanent change.40 
Therefore, the following conclusion seems imperative: The 
language of the written text is mute until it comes into being 
through the act of reading. Each text as such is dead, mummified, 
virtual, or to quote once more W. v. Humboldt: Language 'hat 
nirgends, auch in der Schrift nicht, eine bleibende Statte, ihr 
Cf. Gulich/Raible 1977. 
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gleichsam todter Theil muB immer im Denken aufs neue erzeugt 
werden' (438). When reading as an institutionalized craft has to be a 
methodical operation, the aim of which is to understand the 
meaning and to produce the sense of a particular text, it is right and 
proper to call it interpretation. But we must not forget that the result 
of this operation - the identity of a particular text - has always to be 
produced anew and is prey to constant discussion and re-evaluation, 
the identity being dependant upon the ever floating gap (difference) 
between the focalized and the ignored. Exactly this precarious 
dynamic and contingency nurture the text's virtual life, and so one 
could very well argue that the criterion of textuality is beyond a 
strict methodological stipulation. 
From a point of view of precision we could argue that the 
characteristic feature of textuality is directly dependent upon the 
procedures of a trained formal analysis because the figurative 
criterion of weaving has its root in the rational criterion of 
connectivity. 'Connectivity' suggests that interwoven constellation 
of parts and whole, or, in other words, unity in variety (Einheit in 
der Mannigfaltigkeit) which automatically seems to accompany all 
our thinking about a complex universe of signs. At this point, 
according to my opinion, the analogy between written text and 
social action must be even more carefully examined: 
1. Social actions manifest themselves in several media, texts in the 
only medium of linguistic signs and/or written characters. 
2. The observation of social actions belongs to the very situation in 
which the action to be observed unfolds, while texts are read 
independently of the situation of their production. 
3. Each written text has its own legibility which must not be 
misunderstood as a referential token of the surrounding world. 
Paul Ricoeur's 'occultation du monde circonstancieVAX 
paraphrases very well the fact that a written text can be seen and 
experienced as an autonomous world (une quasi-monde).42 
4 1 Ricoeur 1970, 185. 
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4. A written text is, to a certain degree, its own interpreter since 
the textures of actions, images, arguments, speeches, etc. - the 
peculiar and individual properties of one and the same text - are 
the outcome of an internal energy the source of which can be 
traced by reading it, in a decontextualized context, as an 
expression of the intentio opens. 
5. From this follows: To methodically interpret a text means to 
detect and at the same time constitute the internal meaning of 
the particular text universe and, therefore, has to be 
distinguished from using the text as an argument, as an index of 
the author's personal experiences or as a document of historical 
and/or social events. 
The distinction, suggested above, between interpretation and use of 
a text makes it possible to draw a methodological line between 
contextual and intertextual readings on the one hand and versions of 
interpretation on the other hand. Interpretation has as its task 
investigating the meaning of the particular text-world, and is for 
that reason obliged to methodically open a path into the text-internal 
system of self-interpretation. Only when this is done it may be 
reasonable to use the reading thus achieved in order to employ the 
particular text as a link to those questions which are at the heart of 
contextualist and/or intertextualist interests. 
The fact, however, that a written text usually is read 
independently of its first emergence does not exclude the quest for 
intentionality. Eco insists on three forms of intentionality, which 
might become effective in each text interpretation: 
Intention of 
Author <=interaction=> Text Reader ^ i n t e r a c t i o n s 
(intentio auctoris) 'intentio operis) (intentio lectoris) 
Meaning 
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The arrows indicate that between the author, the text and the ideal 
reader, imagined by the author himself, there is an interrelation 
which in a radical sense differs from the communicative 
interrelations apparent in situations of social interaction. 
But if one wants to transfer the model of intentionalist 
interpretation to the analysis and interpretation of social actions 
then some crucial modifications must be made: in place of the 
author's intention (intentio auctoris) are to be set the intentions of 
the actors {intentiones actorum), in place of the intentio operis the 
unconscious and unforeseen intentiones actionis and, finally, in 
place of the intentio lectoris the intentions of the observer and 
analyst. This transfer or translation of the model of text-
interpretation into the field of cultural analysis might open the eyes 
for different types of intention effective in social action. And it 
could remind us that there is a gap between even the most 
thoroughly thought out intention and the concrete action, the actions 
often enough causing effects that were not intended, the reason 
being the heteronomy of the conditions of acting. 
Once again we encounter an obvious incompatibility between 
the interpretations of texts and that of cultures with the help of the 
text model. The intentio auctoris in writing necessarily includes the 
hope to find and even to instruct a reading subject, while in social 
action the intention of the actors to count with the attention of a 
possible observer and interpreter has to be considered a disturbing 
fact for both sides. 
Academic Constraints and Theory-building 
In Historiography as well as in Ethnography the intentions of the 
researcher, which normally depend upon pressure to get on well in 
the academic world, decide about selecting an object, about how the 
field should be sketched out and about the perspectives and general 
guidelines of investigation. This usually influences the meaningful 
outcome of the particular research in a profound manner. The 
fieldworker picks up his tools on the presumption that he will be an 
author who is in control of a certain theoretical framework, of the 
collected data, of the faculty to convincingly represent what he 
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'read' in the field and, last but not least, control of himself as a 
member of a different (academic) culture. Reading social actions as 
textual configurations implies - as I have tried to point out above -
theoretical interest not only in the general assumptions of socio-
anthropological epistemology, but implies interest also in those 
questions that refer to the rhetoric, i.e. the representational text-
building of anthropological knowledge. Accordingly the authority 
of the author has to be seen as a problematic source of evidence. 
And both attitudes are effective as intentional factors already in the 
earliest phase of organizing and preparing the course of fieldwork 
and/or of historical investigation. There is, of course, nothing wrong 
with that because the correlation between means and ends is a 
rational choice we are used to carrying out not only in scientific 
research but also in every day life. 
One of the very old methodological questions in anthropology 
refers to the application of the terminologies, textualities included, 
developed in academic departments of Western cultures to cultures 
of non-Western origin. One often hears the claim that to use 
Western concepts in order to describe and interpret non-Western 
phenomena encourages a clash of cultures rather than facilitating 
mutual understanding. If this really were the case, all academic 
disciplines striving for better understanding - we call them 
humanities - would just be public nuisances. I believe that behind 
this argument lurks a politically, if not morally tainted fallacy. 
Controversies about the adequacy and justification of concepts and 
theoretical presumptions are nowhere as passionate as in the 
academic disciplines concerned with interpreting and 
comprehending linguistic and sociocultural phenomena. In these 
disciplines theory-building is a very versatile affair. And this is one 
of the reasons why those theories, in comparison with scientific 
hardware, are called soft theories and theories of limited range -
limited in time and in scope, permanently open for objection and 
subsequent changes. 
The fact is that theory-building in the humanities - including 
cultural studies and social anthropology - is an immanent aspect of 
communication and text-building within the confines of the specific 
discipline, that is, within the confines of a very particular cultural 
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segment, i.e. academia. They, therefore, must not be misunderstood 
as doctrinal and fixed in their meaning. On the contrary: these 
theories are, if they resist the temptation of dogmatic closure, 
ambiguous themselves, a quality they share with their objects which 
may facilitate the restructuring of the systematic preconditions 
during the course of research.43 And what is more, those key 
concepts with metaphorical or figurative traits may inspire the 
creative imagination of the researcher to go further in the invention 
of new research conceptions and strategies than a tightly defined 
operational imperative would allow. 
These rather abstract remarks should not obscure the 
dependence of cultural research and corresponding theory-building 
on cultural change in general or on the changes in ordinary 
language-use. Cultures perceived as readable become portable 
cultures and this mirrors the fact that cultures in our times - and 
today there is no culture which is not in touch with modernity - are 
losing their centres and show more and more the features of migrant 
and interlacing performative patterns. 
cf. Mommsen 1979. 
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